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Alessio iocchi
SPACE OF REFUGE, SPACE OF WAR:  
RESHAPING TERRITORIAL ORDER  
IN THE LAKE CHAD AREA
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this contribution is to frame the role and significance of borders 
and national space in the Lake Chad area in the wake of the expansion of the 
so-called “Boko Haram” insurgency. Since 2011, the forced repositioning of 
entire communities in neighboring states, the spread of refugee camps and the 
coordinated military effort conducted by the Multi-National Joint Task Force (a 
transnational army created by Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin) 
have led to a re-think in the relationship between mobility and territory, vio-
lent conflicts, and political entrepreneurship. Renewed political attention has 
mostly translated into a massive military-coordinated operation and in a series 
of emergency and development measures, which in turn have supplied the 
area with the basic social services that have traditionally been neglected by 
central governments. The gradual process of securitization, militarizing, and 
policing the area is testing the resistance of communities that have already 
endured cycles of economic and political marginalization, while increasing 
violence from “Boko Haram” and its affiliates is further destabilizing a weak-
ened social balance. This work aims to study how terrorist violence and the 
militarization of public life in the region have reshaped the relationship 
between communities and their territory, while offering reasoning on concepts 
of territoriality, governmentality, and social identity.
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During 2016, weakened by factional struggles among various leading fig-
ures from its Shura and worn down by the attention of the Multinational Joint 
Task Force (MNJTF), Jamā’at Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da‘wa wa’l-Jihād has fatally lost 
its grip over large portions of the rural areas it once controlled. 1 Arrests by 
Nigerian, Chadian, and Cameroonian police 2 diminished the group’s ambi-
tions to “remain and expand” while almost simultaneously, al-Dawla 
al-Islāmiyya (The Islamic State Organization) began to decline in Syria and 
Iraq. 3 Today, though virtually defeated according to the propaganda-style 
statements by Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, 4 Boko Haram is still 
able to move freely and operate in two small fiefdoms in the Mandara 
Mountains and Waza National Park (on the Cameroon-Nigeria border), 5 while 
a plethora of “affiliated” groups has spread all across the Lake Chad area, pro-
voking one of the fastest and largest population mass movements the zone has 
1. Jamā’at Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da‘wa wa’ l-Jihād is the name of the historical core orga-
nization founded by the late Muhammad Yusuf (d. 2009), which came to be popularly 
known as “Boko Haram”. In its relatively brief history (2009-2017), the Jamā’at has 
faced a number of leadership conflicts, and has split into several inter-connected, yet 
divergent, branches. Among the most important branches are those led by the infa-
mous Abubakar Shekau and Mamman Nur, the founder of and catalyst for Jamāʿatu 
Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān, commonly known as Ansaru, and the splinter 
association of Boko Haram. Another important division occurred in March 2015 after 
components of the group pledged allegiance to al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya (The Islamic 
State Organization), thus becoming al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya Wīlāyat al-Gharb al-Ifrīqiyya 
(The Islamic State Organization’s West Africa Province): this branch is apparently led 
by Yusuf’s youngest surviving son, Abu Musab al-Barnawi.
2. “Khalid al-Barnawi: Nigeria Islamist group head ‘arrested’”, BBC Africa, 3 April 
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35956301 (consulted 7/3/2017); “Tchad : 
un chef de Boko Haram arrêté”, BBC Africa, 29 June 2015, http://www.bbc.com/afrique/
region/2015/06/150629_tchad_arrests_boko_leader (consulted 7/3/2017). 
3. The reference is to the motto assigned as a title of the Dabiq issue published in 
November 2014. “Remaining and expanding”, Dabiq, issue no. 5, November 2014.
4. “Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants ‘technically defeated’ – Buhari”, BBC Africa, 24 
December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618; “Boko Haram 
technically defeated, Buhari insists”, Punch, 6 February 2016, http://punchng.com/
boko-haram-technically-defeated-buhari-insists/ (both consulted 7/3/2017).
5. This is supported both by evidences drawn from the chronicles of attacks, 
suicide-bombings, massive kidnappings, ambushes and clashes reported by interna-
tional and local medias in the last six months on the Nigeria-Cameroon border and 
neighboring areas (October 2016- April 2017) and by information collected by the 
author through several interviews in the concerned area during the same period.
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ever known, despite its long history of migrations. In this paper 6, we will ana-
lyze how the dynamic of violence and counter-violence started by “Boko 
Haram” changed realities and livelihoods in the Chad Basin, with a special 
focus on the living conditions of internally displaced persons and their per-
ception of state, terrorist violence, and social space.
THE HOARDING DYNAMIC AND THE BOKO HARAM REGIME
The Lake Chad region is a space made up of periodically flooded areas, includ-
ing marshes and wetland, and areas that are subject to irregular flooding: 
islands, the shoreline, and its hinterland. The environment is therefore subject 
to changes in flooding patterns, depending on the levels of precipitation in the 
Chari basin, which has thus given rise to an a minima description of the phys-
ical geography of the lake as the “petit lac”, “moyen lac”, and “grand lac” 
(Tilho 1904). The so-called grand lac last appeared during the 1950s, leaving 
space for the moyen lac. Since the mid-1970s the petit lac, which is made up 
of several bodies of water separated by the central Great Barrier, has repre-
sented the current geographical condition of Lake Chad. These waters are 
highly subject to flooding, which extends the lake’s surface through seasonal 
and permanent swamps (Magrin, Lemoalle, Portier 2015). The vegetation is 
composed of reed and papyrus (the widely-spread ambatch), and naturally 
forms a number of floating islands (kirtas), which are used by fishermen and 
shepherds. Circulation in the area has always been complicated by its geogra-
phy, and it has only permitted a relative degree of control, first by the colonial 
administration and then by the four different states into which the lake has 
6. The data for this analysis are the result of field research begun in October 2014 
and still ongoing in April 2017 in various local areas in the wider Lake Chad Basin, 
mainly in Nigeria and Chad. More than 50 semi-structured in-depth interviews, dis-
cussions, and dialogues have been conducted in Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, N’Djamena, 
Bol, and Baga Sola. We have chosen not to mention the identity of the interviewees 
in this paper for security reasons.
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been divided (Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon). 7 Because circulation is 
dependent on oscillations in water levels, the archipelago’s inhabitants have 
become nomads who migrate seasonally with their livestock. 8 A complex 
mechanism of regulation among the different communities has yielded to a 
customary right for the attribution of land, usage fees for land, and manage-
ment of the lake’s natural resources. 9 The great droughts (1973, 1984), which 
gave rise to the current petit lac season, marked the beginning of a progressive 
asymmetry between resources and users. While in the mid-1970s the popula-
tion around the lake numbered approximately 700,000, the total number of 
people who depended on the lake’s resources in 2013 was more or less 2.2 
million. This rise in economic exploitation in such a short timespan has seri-
ously endangered the environment, compromising the livelihood of its primary 
inhabitants, the Buduma, and intensifying conflicts between long-standing 
users, new arrivals, and waves of West African migrants (Malians, Burkinabés), 
while also throwing resource management off balance. Fishermen use 
7. In 1998, after many years of neglect, the four coastal states (on the initiative of 
Nigeria, which created the first outpost in Baga in 1994) abandoned the idea of inter-
vening politically and resorted to military force in an early attempt to place the area 
under their control and halt smuggling and trafficking activities, to “checkmate ban-
ditry”. When attacks by Boko Haram began in 2012, the mandate of the so-called 
Multi-National Joint Task Force was expanded to include counter-terrorism activities. 
See “BAGA: Multinational Joint Task Forces, BHTs And Host Community”, Lt. Col. 
Sagir Musa, Sahara Reporters, 7 May 2013, http://saharareporters.com/2013/05/07/
baga-multinational-joint-task-forces-bhts-and-host-community-lt-col-sagir-musa 
(consulted 10/5/2017).
8. The maze-like geography of the lake and, broadly speaking, its population, has 
been interestingly highlighted since the earliest attempts by colonial administrators to 
administer it and exercise some kind of sovereignty over it, as has been stated in a 
number of official reports: see, for instance “Reconnaissance effectuée dans les îles du 
lac Tchad (Fort Lamy, 10 juin 1902)”, “Rapport Politique (Goulfei, 1 mars 1902) sur la 
Région Militaire du Tchad: Région de Bas-Chari, Îles du Tchad, Région Dagana-
Kanem”, ANOM AEF GI D/4(4)/1-2, Archives nationales d’outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence. 
Likewise, there is an interesting account of the relationship between the colonial 
administration and the lake’s inhabitants, the so-called “nomades du lac”, by the late 
Colonel Jean Chapelle (1905-1986). See J. Chapelle (1987).
9. These processes and the attribution of lands in general are administered by three 
key figures: the “chef de canton” (District Officer), the “chef de village, île ou polder” 
(village, island or polder chief), and the “diguedji”. The first of these, or Mai, who is a 
religious figure, has a mandate to settle conflicts between the inhabitants and provide 
security for the community. The second is in charge of the assignment of plots of land 
to family members according to the number of workers present. The third has a dual 
responsibility: as master of ceremonies and to decide on boundaries for plots of land.
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kilometers of “Malian” gura (fish traps), thus creating a barrier (dumba) behind 
which herds graze in the rich green pastures. After the herders come the farm-
ers, who employ motor pumps to “raise the waters” and grow corn, potatoes, 
cowpeas, onions, tomatoes, and sugarcane. The shores of the lake are deemed 
to be a free access zone, and even though many disputes ensue among its 
users, very few end up in court. In addition, speculative ploys by urban pur-
chasers and the commercial élite have caused an escalation in land prices, 
which has seriously affected the poor belt of farmers, herders, and fishermen, 
leaving them few opportunities to lawfully govern access rights to the land. 
These phenomena have revived the native-settler dichotomy discourse, and 
economic and linguistic rivalries have been increasing in ports and markets, 
mainly between the native (Buduma, Kanembu) fishermen and the Hausaphone 
commercial élite. 10 Because they control the fishing trade and in many cases 
fund fishing trips, the latter have gained a prominent economic role in the lake 
region, and are mostly perceived as importers of an alien economic vision that 
clashes with the customary rights of free access to the waters and diverts the 
natural riches of Lake Chad to faraway urban centers. Nonetheless, this eco-
nomic reality has been quickly accepted. In recent years, a widespread practice 
has emerged that sees a number of small-scale fishermen equipped with indi-
vidual speedboats or motorized pirogues descend upon the various shorelines 
and unlawfully occupy them. This cannot be unconnected with the simultane-
ous spread of small caliber, mostly artisan, home-made weapons, 11 and of 
more modern AK 47s of uncertain origin, 12 which are traded and transported 
between the various shores of the lake by Buduma smugglers and ferrymen 
across a transnational space that is the equivalent of a lawless area (zone de 
non-droit). Many fishermen and herders recount that customs officers were 
acquiescent to and sometimes involved in this trade before the explosion of the 
“Boko Haram” crisis, which partially explains how checks and fees used to be 
10. As elsewhere, the native-settler dichotomy is one of the most sensitive issues, 
especially as it relates to rights to economic exploitation. On the Nigerien and 
Nigerian sides of the lake, Kanuri elders tend to ascribe a presumed “Chadian” origin 
to Buduma fishermen, drawing their conclusion from the fact that there are no 
Buduma toponyms on their side of the lake. On the conflicts relating to the fisheries 
sector, see Hadiza Kiari Fougou 2014, Impacts des variations du niveau du lac Tchad 
sur les activités socio-économiques des pêcheurs de la partie nigérienne, PhD thesis, 
Université Abdou Moumouni, Niamey (Niger). 
11. These are collectively known in north-eastern Nigeria as “Dane guns”. Despite its 
name, the rifle is manufactured locally, and is widespread throughout West Africa. It 
derives its name from early trading relationships that the Kingdom of Denmark main-
tained in the Gulf of Guinea for almost two centuries (1658-1850) thanks to the Gold 
Coast colonies (in present-day Ghana).
12. Allegedly from Sudan and Libya.
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circumvented. 13 The appearance of “Boko Haram” on the lake and the favora-
ble reception provided by some islanders reveal the self-proclaimed sect’s 
shallow religious façade and the main source of its economic assets: many 
young islanders seem to join the organization’s ranks as a means of liberating 
themselves from traditional hierarchical power structures that exclude them 
from enjoying what they perceive as the conditio sine qua non for an emanci-
pated life in the community: a craft or trade, a vehicle, social status to take a 
wife. For them, accepting the deal proposed by the organization seems to be a 
quicker and more efficient way of obtaining what they regard as their legiti-
mate right. This attitude would appear to be the logical outcome of the 
deteriorating process of land and water grabbing that began many years ago, 
and also of the growing ties between “Boko Haram” and ordinary bandits that 
is taking place in the Gwoza, Madagali, Michika, Bama, and Dikwa Local 
Government Areas (LGAs) (Adamawa and Borno State, Nigeria) and Mayo-
Sava (Cameroon) following the implementation of deregulation, privatization 
and adjustment policies. 14 Many adults in the communities we visited explain 
this behavior by pointing out several interconnected economic issues: the 
shrinking of the lake’s dimensions, increasing competition, and relative job-
lessness. In the background to their words there is the cultural perception of the 
archipelago’s isolation from the rest of the country: although they are fully 
aware of the changes, trends, and goods coming from the cities, young people 
see themselves as “far” from them, with few possibilities to integrate or afford 
them except by violent means or hoarding. 15 Rather than representing a mas-
sive episode of religious zeal, “Boko Haram”’s appearance in the region has 
been an opportunity for a brutal and unscrupulous buy-out of exclusive trad-
ing, fishing, and herding rights around the lake. Significantly, for many 
interviewees, “entering Boko Haram” (devenir Boko Haram) seems to be 
somewhat equivalent to se débrouiller (getting sorted out, broadly speaking) 
referring to coupeurs de route (road-cutters), 16 descripted by S. Issa on the 
Diamaré plains (Cameroon) as the art de bien se conduire (Issa 2012). The 
main effect of this process is that the lake’s precarious equilibrium is 
13. Interview, Bol (Chad), December 2016.
14. In many cases, it has been observed that the funds and goods collected by means 
of violent dispossession by criminal gangs operating under the “Boko Haram” banner 
are seldom employed to finance legal businesses (such as the cattle, keke NAPEP 
(motorized rickshaw), or market business), thereby creating a continuous flow 
between the illegal and legal realms. See A. Iocchi 2016, “Boko Haram: Trans-
National Flows and the Quest for an Economic Space”, in Annual Review of Islam in 
Africa, no. 12\13, pp. 97-105.
15. Interviews with many unemployed young people in Bol and Baga Sola, December 
2016.
16. Interview, Baga Sola (Chad), December 2016.
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endangered: replacement of the working cross-functionality of these fertile, 
swampy spaces by exclusive use by private owners stands in opposition to 
customary rights, poses serious mobility problems for the population, and dis-
turbs, and even weakens, the natural cycles of this fragile environment. Over 
the past thirty years, the intensification of speculative practices has set in 
motion a cycle of increasingly aggressive economic competition for the rela-
tively scarce resources, which in turn has produced a widespread 
marginalization of “native” groups, and, as a result, an underlying malaise. 
“Boko Haram”’s expansion into the “swaths” of Lake Chad has exploited this 
dissatisfaction and used it to give new life to an organization that had seemed 
worn down, divided and conflicted. The employment of religious arguments 
(tawhīd, jihād, the fight against bidaʼ and širk) for the recruitment of young fils 
de Buduma (islanders) appears to be crucial here: in line with the dynamic 
found in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsagana (Cameroon) and south-eastern Borno 
(Nigeria), where Boko Haram attracted young people who were precariously 
employed in markets and urban centers and had recently converted to Islam 
(butchers, mini-bus chargeurs, or clandomen), the archipelago’s reputation as 
an area of recent Islamization where superstitions and kirdi (non-Muslim) prac-
tices are still widespread and people are eagerly seeking religious modernization 
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has somewhat facilitated the task. 17 However, “Boko Haram”’s religious appeal 
and strategy of economic accumulation only worked for so long as the impos-
ing military deployment was located far from the Lac territory and the region’s 
economy had not been impaired by a state of war and the ensuing humanitar-
ian emergency. When the islands were abandoned, the once free flow of herds 
began to decrease, and pillage was no longer economically rewarding; the 
operations led by locally-affiliated groups were thus revealed to be an inevita-
bly short-sighted solution to long-standing issues. In the long term, “Boko 
Haram”’s strategy of economic accumulation through a form of lagoon ban-
ditry failed to be viewed by most of the population either as a legitimate means 
of survival, as the most recent news of massive defections seems to demon-
strate, or even as a useful one. The surrender of approximately 400 people 
17. Although the lake’s geography kept the islanders in relative isolation until recent 
years (the process of apprivoisement was still under way in late colonial times, 
between 1950 and 1960), the Buduma islanders live in the heart of one of the oldest 
Islamic regions in Africa. Apart from the continuous commercial traffic that links all 
the communities in and around the lake in spite of the different political regimes, one 
needs to take account of the great cultural proximity and the shared religious history. 
Echoes of Uthman dan Fodio’s jihād in 1804 and the undisputed prestige of the 
al-Kanemi dynasty of the Kanem-Bornu Empire have contributed to shape the cultural 
and religious identity of many Muslims in the Lake Chad Basin: Bornu is traditionally 
regarded as an indisputable abode of Islamic knowledge, and many of the lake’s chil-
dren and teenagers are sent there to study and learn the Quran (thus becoming gar-
danci). Another important religious aspect that must be mentioned is the significance 
of the Mahdist memory of the Adamaoua and Gombe Emirates (part of the Sokoto 
Caliphate, which is now split between Nigeria and Cameroon), which is identified 
through different figures: Attahiru I, a Sarkin Musulmi (Commander of the Believers) 
who rejected British occupation in 1903 and started his hijira eastward, dying in 
Gombe; the Sudanese warlord turned Mahdi Rabih az-Zubayr ibn Fadlallah, who 
died in present-day Kousseri in 1900; Hayatu bin Said, a Fulani cleric from northern 
Adamaoua (Cameroon), who was imprisoned by British officers in 1923; Jibril Gaini, 
a follower of Hayatu bin Said and the creator of a Mahdi state on the Sokoto-Bornu 
border in present-day Gombe (Nigeria). See R. A. Adeleye 1970, “Rabih b. Fadlallah 
and the diplomacy of European imperial invasion in the Central Sudan, 1893-1902”, 
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 399-418; M. Njeuma 
1971, “Adamawa and Mahdism: The Career of Hayatu Ibn Sa’id in Adamawa, 1878-
1898”, The Journal of African History Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 61-77; and J. E. Lavers 1967, 
“Jibril Gaini: a preliminary account of the career of a Mahdist leader in North-Eastern 
Nigeria”, Research Bulletin, Centre of Arabic Documentation, Ibadan, iii, I6-38. 
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(men, women, and children) from the Kaiga and Ngouboua areas 18 between 
August and October 2016 is only the beginning of a process that is still under 
way, and which demonstrates the comparatively poorer economic attractive-
ness of “Boko Haram”’s regime today, its substantial lack of efficiency in the 
face of the greater military means of the MNJTF, and its lack of appeal com-
pared to the services provided by humanitarians and NGOs. 
A SPACE OF REFUGE, A SPACE OF WAR 
Within this difficult equilibrium, the displacement of entire communities at the 
hands of “Boko Haram” has brought the region to its knees. In Chad alone, 
275,000 people are in need of humanitarian assistance. In the Lac Region, 
there are 127,000 displaced people, including 6,600 refugees, and there are 
fears that rising insecurity and wide-scale military operations could trigger 
new population displacements. Meanwhile, food security has continued to 
worsen, with more than 133,000 severely food insecure people in the region 
(World Vision 2016). Displaced communities are relying mainly on food assis-
tance in a region where many of the host population are already highly 
vulnerable, and malnutrition rates continue to be above emergency thresh-
olds. 19 This situation has been aggravated by the constant flows of people, 
which has significantly reshaped social stability and territorial order in the 
region. In the Department of Mamdi, the Sultan and chef de canton, Youssouf 
Mboudou Mbami, has guaranteed the settlement of a number of displaced 
communities in areas within range of the city, all along the main route con-
necting Bol to Baga Sola, at the same time making them reachable by the 
NGOs operating in the area and finally safe from the frequent “Boko Haram” 
incursions. 20 The shoreline and the hinterland between the two cities have 
seen an explosion of encampments and villages, which has meant that the 
inner archipelago has become virtually deserted. Thanks to their position, 
18. “Tchad: nombreuses redditions d’éléments de “Boko Haram” en provenance du 
Nigeria”, RFI, 13 November 2016, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161113-boko-haram- 
tchad-nigeria-redditions-reportage-bagassola (checked 7/3/2017); though the epi-
sode mentioned only seems to be the first: “Niger: reddition de combattants Boko 
Haram”, BBC Africa, 6 January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-38527190 
(checked 7/3/2017).
19. All data are updated to October 2016.
20. Communication with the Sultan, Bol, December 2016.
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many of these sites have been provided with pits and informal schools and 
some of them have temporary medical centers. 21
Life before and since the “Boko Haram” crisis has changed significantly, in 
what many internally displaced persons (IDPs) have significantly referred to as 
“a passage to civilization”: delivery of education and healthcare services and 
direct access to markets and bore holes have turned this once nomadic popu-
lation into a “settled” one that can enjoy the proximity to government 
infrastructures and exposure to life on the mainland. Many people seem to 
enjoy some of what they call the “comforts” of life at the site, with specific 
reference to the provision of food vouchers or pocket money by NGOs. The 
humanitarian machine must intervene in a general situation in which there is 
clearly poor coordination between the military structure and civil society and 
considerable vagueness regarding missions and responsibilities. The difficul-
ties in leading the shift from “emergency” to “development” reflect the 
contradictions of a system that has to simultaneously respond to a military 
crisis and a food emergency, a system which is in need of a strong environ-
mental and regional cooperation plan. The currently-operating “domain 
division” between Chad’s government and the planète des ONG active in the 
Lac region fully reflects a wider, country-level dynamic that has already been 
observed in refugees crisis in Sudan (since 2003) and the Central African 
Republic (since 2004). This dynamic is in turn a mirror of the effect observed 
by M. Duffield on the complementarity between development and security 
(Duffield 2007). The expansion of security to societal aspects of life (the 
“human security” invoked long ago by international organizations) 22 in the 
Lake does not improve the living conditions of displaced people or refugees 
in any way, and yet it marks their distinction, and therefore their seclusion, 
from the community; moreover, the process seriously impairs their capacity to 
autonomously earn a decent living outside the humanitarian machine. The 
topographical structure of the lake leads to unbalanced, and therefore fluctu-
ating, control of the terrain. Army actions vary from time to time based to 
21. Once a neglected peripheral region, in the aftermath of the “Boko Haram” crisis 
the world (and, therefore, local governments) have suddenly taken an interest in the 
Lake Chad area, and have therefore begun to funnel an impressive amount of finan-
cial aid for humanitarian purposes. In January 2017, the European Commission 
released €40 million “in additional humanitarian aid to support the populations in 
the Lake Chad region”, bringing the EU’s overall funding for the region since 2016 to 
over €116 million. Nigeria will receive the largest slice (€22 million), followed by 
Cameroon (€7 million), Niger (€6 million), and Chad (€5 million). During the United 
Nations-supported humanitarian conference on “Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region” 
held in Oslo on 24 February 2017, many donors pledged to donate $458 million in 
relief and an additional $218 in the coming years.
22. UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994.
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external political pressures. The long-sought-after political sovereignty over 
the lake, which has been a chimera for most colonial and post-colonial 
regimes, is asserted through an oscillating military presence, on which the 
NGOs’ work is inevitably dependent. This reveals a great deal about govern-
ance processes inside the Armée Nationale Tchadienne (ANT), which has 
been described as a ‘militianized’ army (Marchal 1997; Debos 2016): heavily 
ethnically-polarized, with a bad human rights record, 23 the ANT seems to 
behave like a troop of praetorian guards that has been recruited on the basis 
of a system of patronage, which is ultimately able to train formidable warriors 
and masters of guerrilla warfare, but clearly not peacekeepers. This general 
lack of accountability in the Chadian army clashes with France’s and the 
United States’ visions of security and development in the area, even though 
they have no qualms about offering massive funding, equipping and training 
to the army. 24 In the Lac region, we can therefore note that resistance between 
security imperatives and the need to implement emergency and development 
actions conveys the impression of a general stalemate among the IDP com-
munity and the local population. As an old religious teacher in the IDP site of 
Kindjiria once said: “We wait for the aid to feed us. We wait for the soldiers to 
be safe. We are stuck.” 25
Many people 26 referred to informal statements by officers and soldiers sta-
tioned in the area, and implied that the security operations and the expulsion 
of “Boko Haram” members from the archipelago is progressing successfully, 
and that people will soon be able to return to their fields and homes, but as 
yet no effective action or assurance has come from the State or from 
23. In this respect, see R. Marchal 2015, “CAR and the regional (dis)order”, in 
T. Carayannis, L. Lombard (eds.), Making sense of the Central African Republic, 
London, Zed Books, pp. 166-193; “Mali: quelle enquête après une possible bavure 
des militaires tchadiens?”, RFI, 27 May 2016, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160527-mali- 
soupcons-bavure-militaires-tchadiens-minusma-enquete-interne-casques-bleus 
(checked 7/3/2017).
24. Between 2009 and 2013, the United States allocated a total of $13 million to 
Chad in the context of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP): it is 
therefore no accident that between 2006 and 2010 Chad became one of the top three 
weapons importers in Sub-Saharan Africa.
25. Testimonies collected at the IDP site in Kindjiria, Mamdi Department (Chad), 
December 2016.




international military organizations. 27 A number of women have admitted to 
finding adjusting to life on the mainland, away from their native lands and 
with no humanitarian aid (bana nasara, literally “white people’s aid”), a 
daunting task: various ménages (household) have suffered the loss of hus-
bands and older sons, and must rely on international aid alone; they see few 
opportunities for them and their younger children in the near future. 28 Current 
prospects leave these people few options but to return to their homes, 
although they are well aware that the “Boko Haram people” may come back 
sooner or later. Some prefer to quietly return to the fields, visiting the IDP site 
only at voucher distribution times. This practice is openly tolerated by both 
NGOs workers and military officers, who understand the situation and see 
some convenience in it: tips and information on sightings and movements in 
the archipelago are an essential part of their security work, and former resi-
dents are also frequently employed as guides. 29 For many others, however, it 
is hard to accept the idea of leaving the humanitarian aid provision program: 
the loss of all their herds and goods and the impossibility of returning to their 
native lands lead many IDPs to see no other option but to rely to bana nasara 
and keep waiting for the end of this war without a front. What used to be their 
home – the floating islands and seasonally flooded lands – is now an outpost 
for the ANT’s operations in the context of the multilateral intervention contin-
gent. Even though increasing large numbers of “Boko Haram” members are 
gradually giving up, a hardline group is in control of many islands on the 
Niger side of the lake. 30 The archipelago is the most uncommon war zone that 
has ever been seen: while the progression of the saison sèche (dry season) 
gradually reveals more and more wetland spaces, solitary herds graze quietly 
and, mostly at dawn, fishermen on pirogues drag their creels out of the water. 
27. Interview collected at the IDP site in Dabantchali, Mamdi Department (Chad), 
December 2016. Besides the Multi-National Joint Task Force that has been deployed 
to fight “Boko Haram”, routine operations in the region by the French Army within the 
framework of Operation Barkhane and by the United States African Command 
(AFRICOM) in the context of the broader ‘war on terror’ have been recorded.
28. Interview, Kindjiria IDP site, Mamdi Department (Chad), December 2016.
29.  Interview, Melea IDP site, Mamdi Department (Chad), December 2016. In fact, 
many NGOs operators seem to turn a blind eye to people who apparently leave the 
IDP site and return to their herding activities on kirtas, while they are still recipients 
of vouchers and aid. The same attitude is shown by police and military officers, who 
turn a blind eye in exchange for informations and tips on people’s movements across 
the wider archipelago.
30. According to information gathered during a conversation with two young female 
refugees who had recently fled from a madrasa camp on the north-west side of the 
Lake (in N’Guigmi Department, Niger), this area was apparently under the command 
of Mamman Nur. Bol, December 2016.
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This tableau is only occasionally changed by the appearance of launches 
crossing the river at high speed. From the mainland, no shots or shouts are 
heard: one might wonder whether the front line, and therefore the “war”, 
actually exists somewhere in the interior of the archipelago.
CONCLUSION
The swamps along the lake have become the unusual front of a war that has no 
agreed front-line and follows no orthodox rules of warfare. The war against 
“Boko Haram” is fought on a maze-like group of floating islands on Lake Chad 
and in the middle of some of the largest and most dense forest between 
Cameroon and Nigeria, on the periphery of what was once the Sokoto 
Caliphate. A significant part of the data and intelligence is collected through 
the powerful means of Western countries, which mostly use hi-tech combat 
aircraft, and also establish the “Sahelian” strategy framework for anti-terror-
ism: drone flights operating from the US bases in neighboring Agadez and 
Garoua join the almost daily flights carried out by the French Armée de l’air 
from the Operation Barkhane base at N’Djamena. The financial support pro-
vided by France and the United States has enabled a gradual modernization of 
the ANT, including intensive training programs with various European Union 
military instructors (in addition to the Flintlock training program developed by 
the US Army), progressive specialization in different areas, and encourage-
ment to cooperate in practical terms with neighboring countries (Cameroon 
above all) in order to fully realize widespread military coverage of the Lake 
Chad Basin area and, latu sensu, of Sahel (Pérouse de Monclos 2015). While 
on the one hand this unusual ‘war on terror’ is being conducted using Western 
military technology’s most sophisticated products, on the other the presumed 
“terrorists” display the most rudimentary artisan weapons, such as bows, 
arrows, spears, and home-made weapons during clashes and violent confron-
tations; only high-ranking chiefs and lieutenants can carry AK-47s and other 
types of assault rifle. Likewise, while drones monitor hundreds of square kilo-
meters of desert, swamp and forest, the most important information comes 
from locally-located informants. The historical emergence of functional sub- 
and trans-national regimes of authority, to which “Boko Haram” is directly 
linked, and their capacity for dispossession and accumulation are constantly 
underplayed for political reasons by both regional and international govern-
ments, which clearly prefer the “religious terrorism” label so that they can 
achieve their own political agendas (Iocchi 2015). In the near future, this will 
most likely lead to a strengthening of multinational military deployment in the 
area. Although it may not be superficially perceived as intruding on the social 
fabric, it is already altering the economy and the stability of an exhausted 
region. While the lake’s communities will undoubtedly continue to accommo-
date hundreds of displaced people who are more or less kinfolk “pour ne pas 
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les laisser sous l’arbre”, they are wondering when the funds employed to apply 
emergency measures will be diverted to financing long-term development pro-
jects. The essential requirement should be to replace these emergency 
encampment models, which ultimately seem to fuel a paradigm of mutual 
dependency that has already been enacted in other realities and is unavoida-
bly doomed to fall short of expectations.
REFERENCES
Adeleye R.A., 1970, “Rabih b. Fadlallah and the diplomacy of European imperial invasion 
in the Central Sudan, 1893-1902”, in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, vol. 5, 
no. 3, pp. 399-418.
Chapelle J., 1987, Souvenirs du Sahel, Paris, L’Harmattan.
Debos M., 2016, “Behind the cliché of the Chadian ‘desert warriors’, militarized politics 
and Idriss Déby’s global political capital”, World Peace Foundation, Summary Paper.
Duffield M., 2007, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of 
Peoples, Cambridge, Polity Press.
Fougou H. K., 2014, Impacts des variations du niveau du lac Tchad sur les activités socio- 
économiques des pêcheurs de la partie nigérienne, PhD thesis, Université Abdou 
Moumouni, Niamey (Niger).
Iocchi A., 2015, “The Boko Haram Franchise and the War on Terror in Nigeria”, in Diritto e 
Questioni Pubbliche 15 (2), pp. 202-214.
Iocchi A., 2016, “Boko Haram: Trans-National Flows and the Quest for an Economic 
Space”, in Annual Review of Islam in Africa, no. 12\13, pp. 97-105.
Lavers J.E., 1967, “Jibril Gaini: a preliminary account of the career of a Mahdist leader in 
North-Eastern Nigeria”, Research Bulletin, Centre of Arabic Documentation, Ibadan, iii, 
I, pp. 16-38.
Magrin G., Lemoalle J. and Pourtier R., 2015, “Atlas du Lac Tchad”, Passages, vol. 183.
Marchal, R. 1997, “Terminer une guerre”, in R. Marchal, C. Messiant, Les chemins de la 
guerre et de la paix, Paris, Karthala.
Marchal R., 2015, “CAR and the regional (dis)order”, in T. Carayannis, L. Lombard (eds.), 
Making sense of the Central African Republic, London, Zed Books, pp. 166-193.
Njeuma M., 1971, “Adamawa and Mahdism: The Career of Hayatu Ibn Sa’id in Adamawa, 
1878-1898”, in The Journal of African History, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 61-77.
Pérouse de Montclos M.A., 2015, “Boko Haram et la mise en récit du terrorisme au 
“Sahelistan””, Afrique Contemporaine, vol. 3, no. 255, pp. 21-41
Saibou I., 2010, Les “coupeurs de route”. Histoire du banditisme rural et transfrontalier dans 
le bassin du lac Tchad, Paris, Karthala.
Tilho J., 1904, “Exploration du lac Tchad”, La Géographie, vol. 13, pp. 194-214.
UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994.
World Vision, Report on the scoping visit to Lake Chad, October 2016.
